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Introduction 
On August 8, 2013, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed a summary 
judgment motion brought by Marvel Characters, Inc. (“Marvel”) in an action against the 
estate of comic book character creator and artist, Jack Kirby.1 The Court found that the 
creations of the author at issue fell under the Work for Hire Doctrine, thereby vesting 
ownership of the rights to the characters in Marvel and denying the estate the right to 
terminate copyright ownership and regain the rights to the characters created by Kirby.2 
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals also recently rendered a similar decision against the 
estate of comic book creator and artist Jerome Siegel, dealing with early drawings, 
advertisements, and comics of Superman.3 The tests that the Circuit Courts of Appeals 
employ in cases involving the work for hire doctrine vary greatly, especially when 
termination of copyright transfers are involved, and could result in differing outcomes with 
similar, or identical, cases tried in different locales. Discrepancies exist in and within the 
circuits as to these types of relationships generally and the tests to define them are not 
clearly laid out across the federal courts. The impacts of these court opinions and analyses, 
as well as the fact that the test used in this context may be contrary to Supreme Court 
precedent, can have a great effect among a wide range of dealings in the entertainment 
industry to such an extent that the Supreme Court could take one of these cases (Marvel 
Characters, Inc. v. Kirby or Larson v. Warner Bros. Entm’t) into consideration if the 
estates were to petition for certiorari. 
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The aim of this paper is to discuss the work for hire doctrine, termination rights in 
copyright transfers, and why the “Instance and Expense” test employed by the Second 
Circuit in Kirby should be reevaluated and changed in order to protect the termination 
rights of authors and their families/estates given under the Copyright Act of 1976. Part I 
will present the current statutory framework of the Work for Hire Doctrine in relation to 
termination of copyright grants and assignments and existing precedent relating to the 
topic. Part II will introduce the Kirby case and discuss the “Instance and Expense” test 
applied by the Second Circuit. Part III will consider the Work for Hire Doctrine in other 
fields in the Entertainment Industry and Part IV will argue why courts should reevaluate 
the tests employed in these circumstances to better protect authors and their families when 
they produce creative works of authorship. 
Part I – Termination of Transfers and the Work for Hire Doctrine Under 
Copyright Law 
Rights in creative works of authorship are freely and easily transferrable to other 
parties by the original creator of a work.4 “A ‘transfer of copyright ownership’ is an 
assignment, mortgage, exclusive license, or any other conveyance, alienation, or 
hypothecation of a copyright or of any of the exclusive rights comprised in a copyright, 
whether or not it is limited in time or place of effect, but not including a nonexclusive 
license.”5 In many instances, especially in the entertainment industry,  this type of transfer 
may be a prerequisite for the publication or other exploitation of a work.6 Because of the 
disparity in bargaining power between creators and publishers, the creators of the 
Copyright Act of 1976 (“1976 Act”) included provisions to protect authors by allowing 
them to regain the rights in their works that may have been assigned or otherwise 
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transferred after the creation of the work because of the bargaining positions of the parties .7 
Termination of a copyright grant or assignment allows for a restoration in the author or 
his/her estate of the rights originally transferred so that the author or successor in interest 
can renegotiate the terms of an additional transfer or to take the copyrighted material 
elsewhere to be exploited by another entity. 
A. Termination of Copyright Transfers 
Sections 203 and 304(c) of the 1976 Act control terminations of transfers of 
copyrights.8 The Congress that enacted the current Copyright Act recognized as 
justification for a recapture of rights the necessity of “safeguarding authors against 
unremunerative transfers … needed because of the unequal bargaining position of authors, 
resulting in part from the impossibility of determining a work’s prior value until it has been 
exploited.”9  
The division of the sections and their application to particular works are bound by the 
date of the grant of transfer in question.10 When the date of grant is on or after January 1, 
1978, §203 applies.11 If the transfer occurred before this date, §304(c) governs .12 The key 
termination section for discussion in this article will be §304(c), as the grants at issue in 
both Kirby and Siegel were originally made prior to 1978.  
The relevant portion of §304 states:  
In the case of any copyright subsisting in either its first or renewal 
term on January 1, 1978, other than a copyright in a work made for 
hire, the exclusive or nonexclusive grant of a transfer or license of the 
renewal copyright or any right under it, executed before January 1, 
1978, by any of the persons designated by subsection (a)(1)(C) of this 
section, otherwise than by will, is subject to termination under the 
following conditions: 
…. 
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…(3) Termination of the grant may be effected at any time during a 
period of five years beginning at the end of fifty-six years from the 
date copyright was originally secured, or beginning on January 1, 
1978, whichever is later. (4) The termination shall be effected by 
serving an advance notice in writing upon the grantee or the grantee's 
successor in title. In the case of a grant executed by a person or 
persons other than the author, the notice shall be signed by all of those 
entitled to terminate the grant under clause (1) of this subsection, or 
by their duly authorized agents.…(A)  The notice shall state the 
effective date of the termination, which shall fall within the five-year 
period specified by clause (3) of this subsection…and the notice shall 
be served not less than two or more than ten years  before that date. A 
copy of the notice shall be recorded in the Copyright Office before the 
effective date of termination, as a condition to its taking effect . 
(B)  The notice shall comply, in form, content, and manner of service, 
with requirements that the Register of Copyrights shall prescribe by 
regulation. (5)  Termination of the grant may be effected 
notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary, including an 
agreement to make a will or to make any future grant…. In all cases 
the reversion of rights is subject to the following 
limitations:…(B)  The future rights that will revert upon termination 
of the grant become vested on the date the notice of termination has 
been served as provided by clause (4) of this subsection .…a further 
grant, or agreement to make a further grant, of a particular author's 
share with respect to any right covered by a terminated grant is valid 
only if it is signed by the same number and proportion of the owners, 
in whom the right has vested under this clause, as are required to 
terminate the grant under clause (2) of this subsection. Such further 
grant or agreement is effective with respect to all of the persons in 
whom the right it covers has vested under this subclause… (D)  A 
further grant, or agreement to make a further grant, of any right 
covered by a terminated grant is valid only if it is made after the 
effective date of the termination. As an exception, however, an 
agreement for such a further grant may be made between the author 
[or owner of the termination right] and the original grantee or such 
grantee's successor in title, after the notice of termination has been 
served… (F)  Unless and until termination is effected under this 
subsection, the grant, if it does not provide otherwise, continues in 
effect for the remainder of the extended renewal term .13 
In essence, the termination provision provides a five-year window beginning once the 56
th
 
year of the original grant ends. Notification of this period must be served to the grantee in a 
writing signed by the grantor, or the party(ies) of interest (persons or entities that have the 
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reversion rights), between two and ten years before the termination will occur. The notice 
must be technically correct in form, substance, and service or it may be found invalid by a 
court. A copy of the notice must then be recorded in the Copyright Office before the date 
of effect. After this has been completed and the termination window arrives, the 
termination is effective and the transfer is no longer in force . 
The provisions of sections 203 and 304(c) are, as one may deduce, very difficult to 
achieve, as stated by the court in the original Siegel case: “a constant theme throughout this 
litigation was that ‘the termination provisions contained in the 1976 Act are among the 
most complex and technical ones in the statute.’”14 They may be easily circumvented by 
the grantees of the rights by exploiting technicalities such as incorrect termination dates, 
incorrect notice date, technical flaws in the termination notice, inclusion of materials 
outside the proper termination period, failure to get proper signature of all parties of 
interest on the notice.15 Sometimes a court will recognize the great difficulty of the 
termination procedure and overlook deficiencies in a termination notice . In the original 
Siegel action, for instance, the court gave the estate of Jerome Siegel a great benefit, stating 
that “given the ‘near-Herculean effort and diligence’ that resulted in the preparation of a 
‘six-pound, 546-page termination notice,’ the absence of these additional listings fell 
within the scope of harmless error, excused by applicable regulations . Accordingly, 
termination validly applied to those materials as well .”16 Even in that opinion, however, 
other mistakes or deficiencies, such as inclusion of works outside the notice period were 
not given such lenience.17 “By thus rendering the device of termination of transfers subject 
to evasion, the unfortunate consequence is that this highly complex addition to the 
Copyright Act often fails to afford any real relief to its intended beneficiaries .”18 It is often 
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a great struggle, often involving court action, for an author or his/her estate to validate a 
transfer termination and receive a reversion of the copyright of a work.19  
B. Works Made for Hire under the Copyright Act 
As emphasized in the above statutory provision, terminations of copyright transfers 
may only take place if the work is not considered a “work made for hire.”20 “The current 
Act expressly provides that a grant from author to employer of rights in a ‘work made for 
hire’ is not subject to the termination provisions regardless of when it is executed .”21 
Section101 of the 1976 Act defines a work made for hire as: 
(1)  a work prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her 
employment; or 
(2)  a work specially ordered or commissioned for use as a 
contribution to a collective work, as a part of a motion picture or other 
audiovisual work, as a translation, as a supplementary work, as a 
compilation, as an instructional text, as a test, as answer material for a 
test, or as an atlas, if the parties expressly agree in a written 
instrument signed by them that the work shall be considered a work 
made for hire.22 
 
If an employee prepares a work within the scope of employment, the work is automatically 
deemed a work made for hire. If these conditions do not exist or the work is created by an 
independent contractor, the provisions of paragraph (2) apply and the work must fall under 
one of the specified categories and the parties must sign an instrument stating the work is 
one made for hire in order for it to be deemed one. “The parties to a grant, [however,] may 
not agree that a work shall be deemed one made ‘for hire’ in order to avoid the termination 
provisions if a ‘for hire’ relationship (within the meaning of Section 101) does not, in fact, 
exist between them. Such an avoidance device would be contrary to the statutory provision 
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that ‘termination of the grant may be effected notwithstanding any agreement to the 
contrary.’”23 As we will see, courts do not always interpret this provision consistently. 
In the event a particular work is deemed a Work for Hire under the definition in 
§101, the employer is deemed to be the author and legal owner of the copyright for such 
work, unless some express agreement or writing states otherwise .24 This affects termination 
rights because if the work in question is deemed to be a work made for hire, the creator has 
no right or ability to regain any rights in the work .25 
 Because terms used in this section, employee and employment specifically, are 
undefined in the 1976 Act, courts over time have produced several different approaches in 
order to determine whether a work is one made for hire.26 Two of the most prominent tests 
that emerged prior to 1989 were the control test and the agency principles test.27 That year, 
the Supreme Court considered the work for hire doctrine as it related to commissioned 
works in Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid.28  
 
 
C. CCNV v. Reid 
CCNV involved a disputed work of visual art. The dispute centered on who owned 
the commissioned sculpture: the artist who created the work or the organization who 
contracted with the artist to create the work.29 By examining the statutory language of the 
definition provision and the intent of the legislature in creating this section of the 1976 
Act, the Court determined that the principles of agency law should govern whether an artist 
is an employee or an independent contractor.30  
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According to CCNV, the distinction of whether an artist is an employee or an 
independent contractor is vital in determining whether a work is made for hire.31 If a work 
is made by an employee, the determination is based on whether the work was made in the 
scope of employment; but if it is made by an independent contractor, the work must fall 
into one of the categories specified in §101 of the 1976 Act.32 The Court explains the 
reason for these distinctions in its consideration of the legislative history of the doctrine in 
the 1976 Act:  
The interested parties selected these categories because they 
concluded that these commissioned works, although not prepared by 
employees and thus not covered by the first subsection, nevertheless 
should be treated as works for hire because they were ordinarily 
prepared ″at the instance, direction, and risk of a publisher or 
producer.33 
 
The importance of CCNV is the conclusion that works commissioned by publishers or 
producers are not automatically or specifically works made for hire. A court must first 
decide whether the relationship between the parties is one of employer-employee or 
employer-independent contractor. Only then can it be determined which section of §101 
should be applied.34 Most importantly, this Supreme Court decision advances the 
proposition that agency principles should guide the analysis in the absence of definitions in 
the Copyright Act and that control or the right to control the work should not be solely 
determinative of the issue of whether a work is “made for hire.”35 
Part II – Marvel Characters, Inc. v. Kirby and the “Instance and Expense” 
Test 
 At various times throughout his career, Jack Kirby produced drawings and works for 
Marvel Comics on a freelance basis.36 Marvel Characters, Inc. v. Kirby centers on certain 
works that were produced by Kirby during the period of 1958-1963.37 In 2009, Kirby’s 
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surviving children sent termination notices to Marvel purporting to exercise their 
termination rights for these works under §304 of the 1976 Act .38 The children served 
“forty-five copyright-termination notices to Marvel Entertainment Inc., and other 
Hollywood studios relating to comic-book characters and stories created by Mr. Kirby, 
including [‘The Hulk’] ‘X-Men’ and ‘The Fantastic Four,’ seeking to recapture copyright 
in these characters as early as 2014”.39 Following the notice, Marvel sought a declaratory 
judgment, which was granted by the lower court, that the works produced by Kirby during 
the period in question were works made for hire, meaning Marvel owned the rights to the 
characters and works and that the termination notices were invalid.40 The Kirbys appealed 
this judgment to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals .41 In Kirby, the Second Circuit 
decided that the works made by Jack Kirby under what is called the “Marvel Method” 
constitute works made for hire and that therefore Marvel owns the rights to the several 
characters and works created by Kirby during his time with Marvel.42  
A. Background and the “Marvel Method” 
During the period of 1958-1963, Kirby, as a freelance artist, created artwork and 
characters, mainly in comic and graphic novel form, that are at issue in this case.43 Kirby 
became known throughout his career as one of the greatest comic book artists of his time.44 
During the time in question in this case, many of his works were utilized by Marvel for use 
in their comic books.45 The methods and conditions under which these works were made is 
at the center of the work for hire issue in this case. At that time, artists that drew for 
Marvel worked under a system called the "Marvel Method." The first step was for Stan 
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Lee, writer, editor, and director of Marvel Comics during the relevant period,  to meet with 
an artist at a “plotting conference”:  
Lee would provide the artist with a “brief outline” or “synopsis” of an 
issue; sometimes he would "just talk…with the artist" about ideas . 
The artist would then “draw it any way they wanted to.” Then a 
writer, such as Lee, would “put in all the dialogue and the 
captions.” According to Lee, he “maintain[ed] the ability to edit and 
make changes or reject what the other writers or artists had created”.46 
 
There were no formal contracts of employment with many of these artists and there were 
also certain aspects typical in traditional employment relationships that were not present in 
the “Marvel Method”:  
It is undisputed that Kirby was a freelancer, i.e., he was not a formal 
employee of Marvel, and not paid a fixed wage or salary. He did not 
receive benefits, and was not reimbursed for expenses or overhead in 
creating his drawings. He set his own hours and worked from his 
home. Marvel, usually in the person of Stan Lee, was free to reject 
Kirby's drawings or ask him to redraft them. When Marvel accepted 
drawings, it would pay Kirby by check at a per-page rate.47 
The relationship between Kirby and Marvel, however, was atypical even of the Marvel 
Method.48 Rather than having a set outline for his work, Lee and Kirby had an open, less 
formal, relationship within the “method.”49 Kirby had less oversight than other artists, a 
freer hand in creation and the Second Circuit recognized “is it beyond dispute…that Kirby 
made many of the creative contributions,”50 to the works, such as thinking up and 
introducing characters, influencing plotting and pitching ideas.51 
B. The 2nd Circuit’s analysis 
On the issue of the works being created as works made for hire, the Court analyzed 
the relationship between Marvel and Kirby through the Instance and Expense test 
formulated under case law interpreting the Copyright Act of 1909 (“1909 Act”) .52 This test, 
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first used in the Second Circuit in Picture Music, Inc. v. Bourne, Inc.,53 and later in 
Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Dumas,54 purports to meld both employee and independent 
contractor situations in work for hire cases by asserting that ″an independent contractor is 
an ’employee’ and a hiring party an ’employer’ for purposes of the [1909 Act] if the work 
is made at the hiring party’s ’instance and expense.’”55 This suggests that if a work is made 
through the hiring party’s instance and expense, it does not matter whether the creator was 
an independent contractor because his relationship is essentially that of an employee .56 
C. “Instance and expense” 
The Second Circuit has stated that a work is made at the hiring party’s “instance and 
expense” when the employer induces the creation of the work and has the right to direct 
and supervise the manner in which the work is carried out .57 “Instance refers to the extent 
to which the hiring party provided the impetus for, participated in, or had the power to 
supervise the creation of the work. Actual creative contributions or direction strongly 
suggest that the work is made at the hiring party’s instance.”58 “The ‘right to direct and 
supervise the manner in which the work is carried out,’ moreover, even if not exercised, is 
in some circumstances enough to satisfy the "instance" requirement .”59 Expense refers to 
the resources the hiring party invests in the creation of the work. 
We have, moreover, suggested that the hiring party’s provision of tools, 
resources, or overhead may be controlling. In other cases, however, we seem 
to have focused mostly on the nature of payment: payment of a ″ sum certain 
″ suggests a work-for-hire arrangement; but ″ where the creator of a work 
receives royalties as payment, that method of payment generally weighs 
against finding a work-for-hire relationship.60  
 
Absent a writing to the contrary, if a court deems the instance and expense test is met, the 
work is found to be a work for hire and the employer is deemed the author  of the work.61 In 
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Kirby, the Court concluded the instance and expense test to be satisfied by Marvel and 
therefore the works created during the time frame at issue were works made for hire .62  
In Kirby, the court ultimately determined that “Marvel's inducement, right to 
supervise, exercise of that right, and creative contribution with respect to Kirby's work 
during the relevant time period is more than enough to establish that the works were 
created at Marvel's instance,”63 and  
Though the record suggests that both parties took on risks with respect to the 
works' success—Kirby that he might occasionally not be paid for the labor 
and materials for certain pages, and Marvel that the pages it did pay for 
might not result in a successful comic book…we think that Marvel's payment 
of a flat rate and its contribution of both creative and production value, in 
light of the parties' relationship as a whole, is enough to satisfy the expense 
requirement.”64 
 
For the instance requirement, the court focused on the closeness of the working 
relationship between Kirby and Marvel. Kirby received many assignments through Marvel 
throughout these years, more than most other artists, and most of Kirby’s output during this 
period was made for Marvel or “with Marvel in mind.”65 Marvel also played “at least some 
creative role with respect to the works.”66 These factors, along with the fact that Marvel 
had the right to supervise, compel Kirby to edit, or reject Kirby’s work lead to the court’s 
conclusion that the instance element was met by Marvel.  
The expense requirement centered on the payment method of Kirby’s output. 
Though Kirby was not paid for expenses, materials, overhaul, or office space, the fact that 
Kirby was paid a flat rate for pages accepted by Marvel and no royalt ies or other residual 
income was made by Kirby, that the expense, or risk of financial loss, was on Marvel .67 
Additionally, the court found that since many of Kirby’s works during the time period were 
14 
 
created as a part of Marvel’s existing stories and products, the expense spent on those titles 
contributed to the expense element.  
After establishing that the elements of the instance and expense test were met, the 
court denied the evidence the Kirbys presented, “a 1975 assignment executed by Jack 
Kirby that purported to transfer interests in certain works to Marvel (but also averred that 
all of his work was for hire), which they say suggests the parties' understanding that Marvel 
did not already own the rights,” was enough to establish a “writing to the contrary.”68 The 
Kirbys also highlighted language in payments that suggested assignment of rights rather 
than work-for-hire status of the works.69 The court determined that this evidence was not 
enough to overcome the summary judgment motion and found in favor of Marvel.70 
D. Flaws in the analysis 
Though the Second Circuit correctly applied the Instance and Expense test in Kirby 
based on existing Circuit precedent, there are serious flaws in the Instance and Expense test 
itself, as well as the analysis the court undertook in the case. First, the test flies in the face 
of Supreme Court precedent. Second, the instance element, which is essentially a control 
test, is biased toward publishers and distributors as they essentially have control over most 
aspects of the works they produce commercially. Finally, the expense element will almost 
always fall on the side of the publisher or distributor because the entities who pay for 
creative works rarely offer compensation in a way that would defeat the expense element. 
In CCNV, the Supreme Court stated that having a control test in a work for hire 
setting defies the purpose and intent of the work for hire provisions of the Copyright Act .71 
In that case, the court stated “transforming a commissioned work into a work by an employee on 
the basis of the hiring party’s right to control, or actual control of, the work is inconsistent with the 
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language, structure, and legislative his- tory of the work for hire provisions.”72The instance and 
expense test, though it seems to be only partially a control test, is in fact a control test . The 
instance element looks at the impetus of the creation of the work, and can be satisfied, 
according to the Second Circuit, by showing control, participation in, or right to control the 
works in question.73 This is the purest essence of a control test,74 especially in light of the 
fact that “the ‘right to direct and supervise the manner in which the work is carried out,’ 
moreover, even if not exercised, is in some circumstances enough to satisfy the "instance" 
requirement.”75 The expense portion of the test essentially inquires as to the expense 
provided by the “hiring” organization and determines whether that is sufficient to suggest a 
work for hire arrangement.76 This may be met by either a direct payment, through payment 
of a flat fee for the work(s), an indirect payment through provision of materials or simply 
by showing that it has assumed the “risk of loss.”77 
In CCNV, the Court discussed control tests and found that the language and the 
legislative intent prohibited employing such control factors alone in determining whether a 
work is one made for hire.78 Under CCNV, if a creator is an employee, the question is 
whether the employee was acting within the scope of her employment in creating the work . 
Answering this question is executed by examining at general agency principles.79 If the 
creator is an independent contractor, the instances under which the work is deemed a work 
for hire are limited to the circumstances laid out in §101(2).80 The instance and expense 
test employed in Kirby has a substantial flaw in that it does not comply with Supreme 
Court precedent. 
Additionally, as applied in Kirby, the instance and expense test is exceedingly 
biased in favor of publishers and distributors in the entertainment industry. The instance 
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factor examines the “extent to which the hiring party provided the impetus for, participated 
in, or had the power to supervise the creation of the work.”81 This element, even if the 
impetus for the work does not come from the hiring party, is preferential to the hiring 
party, especially in the entertainment industry. Even if publishers and distributors are 
willing to decline the ability to have direct participation or supervision in works that they 
are producing for the public, most will exercise some right or power of supervision or 
modification. Publishers specifically are almost always going to have supervisory and 
editing rights over anything they print. It is unlikely that any entity in this type of industry 
would forego the opportunity to supervise or control in some way a product that it is 
responsible for producing and selling to the public.  
The expense element is even more biased in its application because “expense” 
covers both direct and indirect funding, so there are a multitude of means to find the 
expense element met in any instance that does not show clear independence,  a circumstance 
under which this test would not be used. It is also unlikely that a publisher or distributor 
would pay royalties for a creator who may not be in a position of high bargaining power or 
that already has an established career. For those that are in such a place, an entity could 
simply provide costs for the creator in the form of materials or space to work  and meet the 
expense requirement. In the case of Jack Kirby, this may not apply, but in a wider scope, 
the payment of a flat rate as an indicator for work for hire status seems to favor the 
publishers/distributors in an unfair manner. This was the motivation for the court’s 
decision that the expense element was met in Kirby.82 There were several, and indeed more, 
factors that suggested that Kirby was a freelance independent contractor, including the fact 
that he was not receiving employment benefits, office space, or even payment for materials  
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or overhead in creating works for Marvel.83 The court deemed, however, that the payment 
of the flat rate and Marvel’s risk of loss outweighed the other factors in the expense 
analysis.84 The way that the expense portion of the instance and expense test was utilized in 
Kirby is highly favorable of Marvel. As a result of the system in place in the Second 
Circuit, many authors such as Jack Kirby could wrongly have their work classified as a 
work made for hire, when it in actuality is not. 
Finally, the requirement that a “sufficient” writing to the contrary having to be 
provided to overcome the instance and expense test seems to create a paradox for the party 
seeking to terminate. Under the language of the Copyright Act, a writing is supposed to be 
required in order to show that a work is a work made for hire.85 In the absence, and 
possibly even in the presence, of a writing stating that a work or group of works is 
specifically made for hire, the statutory language suggests that it is not . The termination 
provisions also include language that works against the instance and expense test’s 
requirement of a writing to overcome a work being deemed to be “made for hire”:  
Moreover, the 1976 Act provided that if the author did not survive to 
exercise termination, the interest would be distributed to the author’s 
family members as a statutory class. Congress specifically made this 
scheme inalienable: “Termination of the grant may be effected 
notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary. …” The author’s 
statutory successors take the interest despite any assignment or will  of 
the author divesting them of copyright ownership. This provision 
shows Congress’s intent to give the author’s statutory successors, 
rather than the author’s assignees or devisees, the benefits of 
copyright recapture—including the new property right of an extended 
term of protection.86 
 
If the provisions of the act are to be effectively applied as well as the case law, a paradox 
arises for the party seeking to overcome a claim that their (or their ancestor’s) work was 
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made for hire. If there is no writing and the instance and expense test is deemed met by the 
court, the writing that could have vindicated their interests would not be available because 
it would not have needed to be made. If the work by an independent contractor is “made for 
hire”, there should, statutorily, be a writing. Including the need for a writing to overcome 
the instance and expense test, which takes an independent contractor’s work and 
misappropriates it in favor of the hiring party, creates an unrealistic and nearly impossible 
standard for those seeking to terminate copyright transfers. As we have seen on several 
occasions in the instance and expense context, the rights of creators and their successors is 
thwarted by this test and its application. 
 
Part III – The Work for Hire Doctrine Throughout the Entertainment 
Industry 
A. Work for hire and termination rights in other entertainment fields 
The termination of copyright transfers and the work for hire doctrine exist in every 
category of copyright law, so naturally, they have a substantial effect throughout the 
entertainment industry, not simply in the literary or comic space. There are several recent 
cases dealing with these issues throughout the entertainment industry, including in the 
music space, in literature and in film and television. 
B. Scorpio Music S.A. v. Willis 
The case of Scorpio Music S.A. v. Willis87 involved termination rights in the music 
industry. In the case, the defendant, Willis, was the original lead singer of the Village 
People. This case concerns Willis's attempt to terminate his post-1977 grants in 33 musical 
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compositions including the song "YMCA."88 The plaintiff, a music distributing company, 
challenged the validity of the 2011 termination notices sent by Willis and sought a 
declaratory judgment from the court that the works were made for hire or that Willis alone 
could not terminate the transfer because he was a part of a musical group.89 The California 
Southern District Court denied both of these claims and granted Willis’ motion to 
dismiss.90 The court reasoned that an author of a joint work has full authority to 
unilaterally terminate his interest in a copyright transfer, regardless of the other joint 
authors.91 The work for hire claim was dismissed by the plaintiff.92  
C. Classic Media, Inc. v. Mewborn  
Classic Media, Inc. v. Mewborn concerned the character Lassie and related literary works, 
as well as the television and movie rights associated with grants made by the children of the 
author of the work.93 The assignees of the rights attempted to invalidate a termination notice 
based on a second transfer made by the surviving daughter of the author .94 The Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals decided in favor of Merborn, stating that her termination notice was valid and 
effective as to the radio, television and motion picture rights in Lassie, invoking the language of 
the statute to disregard a 1978 (made before the effective date of the 1976 Copyright Act) 
transfer of copyright.95 The court focused on the bargaining power or the parties and 
distinguished similar cases, such as Milne v. Steven Slesinger, Inc.,96 which dealt with the rights of 
Winnie the Pooh, to which the court held against the estate of A .A. Milne because of an 
additional Post-1978 grant, revoking and replacing the original grant, made by Milne’s son, 
Christopher Robin:  
Mewborn's predicament is a far cry from Christopher Milne's . Milne had--and knew 
that he had--the right to vest copyright in himself at the very time he revoked the 
prior grants and leveraged his termination rights to secure the benefits of the 
copyrighted works for A.A. Milne's heirs. Mewborn, on the other hand, would not 
have the right to serve the advance notice that would vest her rights under  § 
304(c)(6)(B) until at the very earliest six years later. Thus, unlike Milne, Mewborn 
had nothing in hand with which to bargain.97 
The Ninth Circuit in Mewborn analyzed the case in light of the legislative intent of the 
protection of the interests of author and his heir's rights . 
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These two cases show that, though the ability of an artist or author to successfully 
terminate a copyright transfer is difficult in and of itself, the addition of the work for hire 
elements (especially the instance and expense test) provide an additional and substantial 
hurdle to the interests and goals of those seeking to regain rights in works . The work for 
hire doctrine is an inhibitory practice that has a detrimental effect and the instance and 
expense test works against the purpose and intent of the termination provisions of the 
copyright act. 
Part IV – Reevaluating the Work for Hire Doctrine In Relation to 
Termination Rights 
 Because of the extensive impact on the entertainment industry that termination 
rights can have, it is very important to examine and reevaluate the terms and standards 
which we apply when dealing with terminations of copyright transfers, especially in 
relation with the work for hire doctrine. Creating a system that follows Supreme Court 
precedent as well as achieving the goals of the legislature in enacting the termination 
provisions is paramount to protecting the interests of creators and their families in the 
works that the creator produced. 
A. A Freer and Easier System 
Though the intention and the desire for creating the termination provisions in the 
Copyright Act were clear, and have been reiterated in several court opinions, legal articles 
and subject matter treatises, in practice, those aims are not always able to be achieved by 
those they were intended to protect. Since its inception, courts have observed that these 
“intricate provisions oftentimes create unexpected pitfalls that thwart or blunt the effort of 
the terminating party to reclaim the full measure of the copyright in a work of 
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authorship.”98 The system in place for termination of copyright transfers is one of rigid 
formality and harsh technicality:   
 
Even when the path to termination is theoretically open, innumerable 
potholes remain. The termination notice for Tarzan was ruled fatally 
deficient in most particulars. Even when “near-Herculean effort and 
diligence” went into the preparation of a 546-page termination notice 
for Superman, abetted by a seemingly endless litigation budget, the end 
result proved decidedly mixed: The termination was recognized as valid in 
some respects, but disallowed in numerous others .99 
 
In order to more effectively provide for the rights of authors and their estates, a change in 
either the law or the jurisprudence should be made to clarify, simplify, and relax the 
termination standards. Suggestions for modifying the law include revising sections 203 and 
304 of the Copyright Act in order to make the process cleaner for those seeking to enforce 
their rights, creating new or modifying existing regulations coming from the Copyright 
office in order to relax the standards from such a rigid template and to allow for mistakes, 
or to have the legislature resolve the language in the Copyright Act concerning terms , such 
as “employee” and “employment” and applications of these terms in the circumstances 
under which they apply. These solutions, of course, contain issues with conception, timing 
implementation and are not perfect. A freer and easier system of allowing termination, for 
example, may make publishers and distributors wary or even unwilling to make deals with 
creators and authors for a while, but in the long run, the termination provisions are a great 
aid to authors and their families and should be continued and made available and more 
practicable for the rights of creators.  
The largest barrier that exists for many of these creators, other than the formality 
and technical aspects of the termination process, is the work for hire doctrine and its free 
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and biased application in the courts. The need to change this is vital and will likely become 
a more prevalent and important issue as more creative works, including music, artwork, 
literature and even comics, reach the time for termination notices to be served and  enacted. 
At this point, there is a danger of courts becoming flooded with claims, actions for 
declaratory judgment and other issues involving termination as more works from 1978 
onward that could be solved by a change in the law or the courts on this subject. This is 
further compelling evidence that should Kirby be appealed to the Supreme Court, the Court 
should consider taking the case. 
B. Freely and more easily terminating transfers of rights moving forward 
As we have seen with the Kirby case, as well as other cases such as Milne and 
Larson, termination of transfers are often not granted to those seeking them . But is this a 
bad practice? Is the idea of allowing authors or their estates to freely and more easily 
terminate transfers of rights a beneficial path for creators moving forward? While 
arguments can certainly be made against the practice, such as the willingness of producers 
and publishers to welcome new artists and authors or the benefits of commercial entities’ 
distribution powers to disseminate information, in instances where transfers have been 
terminated, the outcomes have been beneficial. 
In Marvel Characters, Inc. v. Simon,100 a dispute arose between Marvel and Joe 
Simon in his creation, with Jack Kirby, of Captain America after termination notices were 
sent to Marvel by Simon. In the Simon case, Marvel argued that a settlement agreement 
from a previous case involving ownership of Captain America controlled and barred Simon 
from attempting to assert his termination right and, alternatively, that the character and the 
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series were works made for hire and Simon’s termination notices were invalid .101 The 
Second Circuit Court of Appeals decided that although a settlement agreement was present, 
the agreement did not touch on the ownership of the character or the works and in any case 
did not affect the termination rights that were at the center of the case at hand .102 The court 
also reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Marvel concerning the 
invalidity of the termination notices under the work for hire doctrine.103 The court stated 
that sufficient questions of fact were present pertaining to that issue and that It will be up 
to a jury to determine whether Simon was the author of the Works and, therefore, whether 
he can exercise § 304(c)'s termination right.104 Though the final outcome of the case was 
not published, since this decision, multiple comics, television shows, and motion pictures 
have been released featuring Captain America, suggesting that the issues were resolved by 
the parties. 
Gary Friedrich Enters., LLC v. Marvel Characters, Inc.105 dealt with a situation 
similar to Kirby, as the work for hire issue under the Marvel Method arose in respect to the 
character Ghost Rider.106 In its limited discussion over the issue, the Second Circuit again 
reversed the lower court’s grant of summary judgment to Marvel .107 Finding issues of 
material fact in question over the Marvel Method’s effect on ownership of the Ghost Rider 
character and early works, the court remanded the case for trial .108 
The differing opinions and outcomes of Kirby, Simon and Friedrich emphasize the 
need for courts to formulate a uniform system for determining ownership and rights in this 
area of copyright law. The standard for determining which works are made for hire should 
follow the CCNV standard and should seek to protect the rights of creators. The test 
employed should not be the instance and expense test because, as has been argued here, it 
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is an unfair test that does not accurately follow the intent of the legislature in creating the 
Copyright Act or the Supreme Court precedent of CCNV. 
“The Second Circuit has acknowledged that its jurisprudence concerning the status 
of commissioned works under the 1909 Act has created an almost irrebuttable presumption 
that any person who paid another to create a copyrightable work was the statutory 
'author' under the 'work for hire' doctrine.”109 The fact that this view is known and tacitly 
accepted by courts, not only in the Second Circuit but nation-wide, is a problem that cannot 
be allowed to stand unopposed if the rights of copyright creators is, as the legislative 
history suggests, of great importance under the Copyright Act . Having the right and the 
ability to terminate previous unremunerated transfers was the purpose of Sections 203 and 
304(c). This protection should not be ignored or so easily manipulated . 
Conclusion 
The legislative history of the termination of transfer provision—
Sections 203 and 304(c)—relates to the confluence of two major 
policy changes driving the legislative project: (1) the shift from a dual 
term structure for copyrights and (2) the goal of safeguarding authors 
and their spouses, children, and grandchildren against unremunerative 
transfers and improve their bargaining position. 
…. 
Section 304(c)(5) was drafted for the very purpose of blocking the 
efforts of publishers and persons outside the class of statutory 
successors from frustrating exercise of this right .110 
 
Especially in light of the way the Entertainment Industry functions and the 
remarkable imbalance of bargaining power between creators and exploiters, the test that 
courts use to determine whether a particular work is a Work for Hire should be reevaluated 
and made uniform throughout the Circuits. The method chosen should not be the “Instance 
and Expense” test used in Kirby, as the methods employed by certain entertainment 
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entities, such as comic book publishers and distributors, lend themselves to a finding of 
instance and especially expense in many cases in an unfair manner . It is possible that even 
taking another test into account, the Kirby works may be deemed to be works made for 
hire, but the test employed by the second circuit in Kirby considers these relationships in 
many cases in a biased manner and flies in the face of Supreme Court precedent . This 
paper does not argue that Kirby’s works are not works made for hire, but rather that the test 
that should be employed should be one that conforms closely to the standards set forth in 
CCNV and considers traditional agency principles as well as control standards in order to 
determine whether a particular work of group of works are Works Made for Hire . Such a 
test would help to better serve the aims of the Copyright Act and the interests of authors 
and their families through allowing easier ability to terminate grants and transfers of rights 
and giving these parties a greater position to renegotiate or exploit their intellectual 
property elsewhere. 
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